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SUMMARY: After the global 2007–2008 financial crisis, regulatory bodies proposed alternative auditor selection
processes to enhance auditor independence such as mandatory audit firm rotation or mandatory tendering (i.e.,
rotation that allows for the current auditor to be reappointed). However, these alternative selection processes may not
be effective if management has substantial influence over auditor appointment decisions. We posit that disclosures of
high appointment power of the audit committee will enhance the perceived effectiveness of rotation and tendering, and
thus increase investment recommendations. In an experimental study involving 118 experienced investment
professionals, we examine the impact of the auditor selection process (mandatory rotation, mandatory tendering,
and voluntary selection) and the appointment power of the audit committee (high, low) on investment
recommendations. We find that audit committee appointment power affects investment recommendations only when
a possible auditor change is anticipated (i.e., in the case of rotation and tendering), but not when the auditor selection is
voluntary. Further, rotation and tendering lead to a higher recommended investment likelihood than voluntary selection,
but only when an audit committee has high appointment power. In all, the findings underscore that investors do not view
auditor selection processes in isolation of a company’s internal corporate governance mechanisms.
Keywords: audit firm rotation; audit firm tendering; audit firm voluntary selection; audit committee appointment
power; investment recommendations, corporate governance.
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he global 2007–2008 financial crisis sparked extensive debate on measures to improve audit quality, particularly ways
to strengthen auditor independence in fact and in appearance. In response, proposals designed to mitigate threats to
independence were considered by the European Commission (2013) as well as by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB 2011, 2012), with the Commission adopting regulations requiring public interest entities (PIEs) to
periodically put the audit engagement up for competitive proposals by different audit firms (European Commission 2014) as
part of either a mandatory rotation or a mandatory tender process. With tendering, the current auditing firm may continue in
subsequent years if reappointed. In contrast, rotation takes place when another audit firm replaces the incumbent audit firm.1
Both approaches differ from a voluntary auditor selection process, the prevailing approach in most jurisdictions, where it is up
to the client company and the audit firm to decide whether to continue their relationship. The changes in the auditor selection
process are aimed at preventing the auditor from becoming overly familiar and aligned with the client, the so-called familiarity
threat (e.g., International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants [IESBA] 2013; Bazerman, Loewenstein, and Moore 2002).
In 2011 the PCAOB similarly issued a concept release considering audit firm rotation as a means to enhance auditor
independence. However, the concept release was met with strong resistance from corporate board members, audit firms, and
companies, and, after considerable deliberation, the PCAOB abandoned the idea of mandatory firm rotation. Among the
arguments against mandatory firm rotation was that corporate governance and, in particular, a strong audit committee is
sufficient to ensure auditor independence and audit quality (PCAOB 2012, 2013). More specifically, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 reforms (Section 301) were believed to render mandatory rotation redundant, since a party independent of management
(i.e., the audit committee) selects the auditor.2 However, research has shown that despite regulatory reforms, auditor
appointment power in practice is often deferred to management (e.g., Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2010; Fiolleau,
Hoang, Jamal, and Sunder 2013; Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Lennox, and Mauler 2015). Consequently, auditor independence may
be compromised, since the auditor may feel ultimately accountable to management, the de facto appointing party (e.g., Tetlock
1999; Fiolleau et al. 2013).
Of note, the manner in which companies select and appoint their auditor is not currently publicly disclosed, even though
this information appears to be relevant to financial statement users, as evidenced by a recent Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC 2015) concept release seeking comments regarding increased disclosure in this area. We utilize the power of
the experimental setting to examine the potential impact of such information, if it were disclosed, on professional investor
recommendations.
In the current study, we examine the interactive effect of the auditor selection process (rotation, tendering, voluntary) and
audit committee appointment power (high, low) on the investment recommendations of investment professionals. Drawing on
Source Credibility Theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) and Power Theory (French and Raven 1959), we argue that these two
effects are interdependent. First, we predict a positive main effect for audit committee appointment power and expect that this
effect will be exacerbated by the presence of mandatory rotation or tendering. When auditor selection is voluntary, auditor
changes are relatively rare in practice (Fiolleau et al. 2013; Huang and Scholz 2012). Thus, in this setting it is unlikely that the
audit committee—even when charged with high appointment power—will initiate an auditor change. However, in settings
where auditor changes are enforced (i.e., mandatory rotation), investors are faced with uncertainties about the quality and
independence of the successor auditor, which an audit committee with high appointment power can help alleviate.
Second, we predict that mandatory tendering and rotation have a positive effect on investment recommendations when audit
committee appointment power is high, but not when it is low. When the appointment power of the audit committee is low,
investors are likely concerned about the current auditor’s self-interest threat under both voluntary selection and tendering. When it
comes to rotation and tendering, the potentially deficient quality of the future auditor may also be a concern. However, we expect
both these concerns will be alleviated for tendering/rotation with an audit committee that exercises high appointment power.
To test our hypotheses, we conduct a between-subjects experiment with a sample of 118 experienced investment
professionals in The Netherlands. The experimental case describes an opportunity to invest in the shares of a hypothetical listed
company. We manipulate the auditor selection process (mandatory rotation at the end of the current year, mandatory tendering
at the end of the current year, and voluntary) and the appointment power of the audit committee (high, low). We ask
participants to assume the familiar role of an investment specialist and to offer advice to a client about the investment
opportunity. As expected, we find a positive main effect for audit committee appointment power on the likelihood of
1 Of note, the proposed audit firm rotation differs significantly from the requirement of audit partner rotation, which most jurisdictions have adopted, as
rotation at the firm level will lead to an entirely new audit team, instead of just replacing the audit partner involved.
2 In the EU, the audit committee is gradually being granted greater power in selecting the auditor. The audit committee is responsible for the procedure
and recommendation for the selection of statutory auditors. The recommendation should consist of at least two audit firm choices and the justified
preference for one of them (European Commission 2014, Article 16.2).
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recommending an investment; however, this is significant only in the presence of rotation and tendering. Further, given high
audit committee appointment power, rotation and tendering both result in a higher investment level than voluntary auditor
selection. However, when there is low audit committee appointment power, all auditor selection conditions result in an equally
low investment recommendation.
This study makes five important contributions. First, neither the United States nor the EU currently requires explicit
disclosure of the respective power of management vis-à-vis the audit committee in the auditor selection decision, despite the
recent call by the SEC (2015) regarding the relevance to investors of increased disclosures on the auditor appointment process.
Our experimental design provides a unique forward-looking opportunity to examine the impact on investors’ decisions of
providing such disclosures. Our findings suggest that mandatory rotation or tendering may not be effective unless investors are
confident that an auditor change is accompanied by a strong and independent audit committee making the auditor selection
decision. Hence, we draw attention to the importance of properly enforcing implementation and disclosure of audit committee
appointment power, supporting the recent call by the SEC (2015).
Second, our results suggest that strengthening the role of the audit committee may not be effective in the absence of
mandatory rotation or tendering. Third, while extant studies use nonprofessional investors (e.g., Gates, Lowe, and Reckers 2006;
Kaplan and Mauldin 2008) or other professionals such as judges (e.g., Jennings, Pany, and Reckers 2006) to examine financial
statement user responses to auditor selection processes, our study employs a unique pool of experienced investment professionals.
Given their sizeable investments and recommendations to others, investment professionals drive the market (e.g., Nofsinger and
Sias 1999). Fourth, the efficacy of mandatory tendering has not been examined in prior research despite its current implementation
in Europe. Finally, and most importantly, this is the first study to our knowledge to consider and highlight the joint effect of the
auditor selection process and audit committee appointment power on investment recommendations.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. The next section contains a discussion of the prior literature and the
development of the research hypotheses. Subsequent sections provide a description of the method, followed by presentation of the
results. The final section is devoted to a summary of the major findings and their implications for practice and future research.
BACKGROUND, PRIOR LITERATURE, AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Auditor Credibility
According to Source Credibility Theory (e.g., Birnbaum and Mellers 1983), the credibility of a source is affected by its
competence and bias, the latter of which can be interpreted as source independence. In this study, we argue that the current
auditor’s perceived independence affects investors’ investment recommendations. If the auditor is perceived as more (less)
independent, then the audit opinion will likely be viewed as having a higher (lower) level of credibility (Kelley 1973), which in
turn affects information risk and, ultimately, investment recommendations. Furthermore, we argue that investment
recommendations are also influenced by the perceived credibility of the future auditor in the case of an anticipated auditor change.
One of the measures proposed to enhance (perceived) auditor independence and, ultimately, audit quality is to impose
auditor selection processes that restrict auditor tenure. The following section discusses alternative auditor selection processes.
The Auditor Selection Process
Under a voluntary auditor selection process—prevailing, for example, in the United States and before 2016 in the EU—it is
up to the discretion of the company being audited and the audit firm to decide whether to end or continue the ongoing
relationship. The main concern voiced by regulators and standard setters (e.g., European Commission, PCAOB) is that the
frequently lengthy tenure of the auditor may potentially decrease auditor independence, and hence audit quality, due to
excessive familiarity between the auditor and the client. Familiarity may result in a decrease in the auditor’s attention to detail
and (unconscious) incentives to please client management to retain the engagement (e.g., Ewelt-Knauer, Gold, and Pott 2013;
Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gomez-Aguilar, and Carrera 2009; Bazerman et al. 2002). A large body of research examines the impact of
audit firm tenure on audit quality, 3 including a few studies focusing on financial statement user responses.4
3 The majority of these studies suggest an overall positive relationship between tenure and audit quality (e.g., Carcello and Neal 2000; Geiger and
Raghunandan 2002). Interestingly, however, a number of studies observe a decrease in audit quality after some time period (e.g., Davis, Soo, and
Trompeter 2009; Jenkins and Velury 2008; Raghunathan, Lewis, and Evans 1994), resulting in an inverted U-relationship between tenure and audit
quality. This relationship is posited to be the result of increasing client-specific knowledge in the earlier years, leading to greater audit effectiveness,
which is then offset by threats to independence over a longer time period.
4 Dao, Mishra, and Raghunandan (2008) report that shareholders believe that longer auditor tenure has a negative effect on audit quality. On the other
hand, Ghosh and Moon (2005) find that investors perceive longer auditor tenure improves audit quality. Of note, however, it is unclear whether the
results on firm tenure are generalizable to a setting of mandatory firm rotation (tendering), where it is certain (more likely) that the audit firm will not be
reappointed, compared to a voluntary auditor selection process where reappointment is uncertain (e.g., Dopuch, King, and Schwartz 2001).
The Impact of the Auditor Selection Process and Audit Committee Appointment Power on Investment Recommendations 71
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory
Volume 37, Number 1, 2018
Mandatory audit firm rotation has been suggested as a means to alleviate the familiarity threat as rotation limits tenure to a
predefined number of years. Following the 2014 regulatory changes, auditing firms in the EU are now required to rotate after a
maximum engagement period of ten years, subject to extension of another ten years if a tender process is undertaken and 14
additional years in the case of joint audits with more than one principal audit firm (European Commission 2014).5
Mandatory audit firm tendering has also, albeit less frequently, been discussed as a means to enhance auditor independence
as well as market competition. Alongside the EU legislation described in the previous paragraph, the U.K. has introduced
mandatory tendering where the 350 largest companies are required to put their statutory audit out for tender at least every ten
years (U.K. Competition Commission 2013). Conceptually, the main difference between rotation and tendering is the
possibility of the reappointment of the current auditor that is permissible with tendering but not allowed with rotation.
A few studies have examined the effects of audit firm rotation on financial statement users’ judgments.6 In 2003, the U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO 2003) surveyed and interviewed a variety of stakeholders on mandatory audit firm rotation.
In its final recommendation, the GAO emphasized the perceptions of most surveyed stakeholders that the costs of introducing
rotation would likely outweigh the benefits. However, the majority of Fortune 1000 companies consulted believed that
investors’ perceptions of auditors’ independence would likely increase under mandatory audit firm rotation. In an experimental
study, Daniels and Booker (2011) report that the presence of an audit firm rotation policy results in bank loan officers viewing
auditors as more independent. However, perceptions of audit quality are not affected.
Some research findings further suggest that mandatory audit partner rotation may be sufficient to achieve a high level of
perceived auditor independence (e.g., Kaplan and Mauldin 2008). However, Jennings et al. (2006) and Gates et al. (2006)
present evidence from experiments with judges and nonprofessional investors indicating auditor independence perceptions are
more strongly positively affected by audit firm rotation than by audit partner rotation.
Reid and Carcello (2017) examine the market reaction to six events in the United States that suggest either increased or
reduced likelihood of the adoption of mandatory audit firm rotation. The results reveal negative investor reaction to the
proposed change, especially for companies that currently have a high-quality auditor or have a longer relationship with their
audit firm. While this study suggests investors view mandatory audit firm rotation negatively, the results may also mirror the
common initial negative reaction to change (Dent and Goldberg 1999), especially when one is relatively happy with the current
situation. It is, thus, difficult to extrapolate from these results to how investors would react if such changes were actually put in
place.
Finally, opponents of both mandatory firm rotation and tendering raise concerns that a change in auditors results in lack of
client-specific knowledge and an effective working relationship with client management. These factors have been identified as
having an important impact on audit quality (e.g., Bell, Marrs, Solomon, and Thomas 1997; Solomon, Shields, and Whittington
1999; Bell, Peecher, and Solomon 2005). Thus, these offsetting effects of rotation and tendering may have a negative impact
on investors’ perceptions of audit quality.
In conclusion, with few exceptions (i.e., Reid and Carcello 2017), prior research suggests that financial statement user
responses to mandatory audit firm rotation are either positive or neutral, but seldom negative, which suggests that investor
perceptions of enhanced independence outweigh concerns about client-specific knowledge. However, as discussed in a
following section, we posit an interaction where the ultimate effect of the auditor selection process will vary depending on the
extent to which the audit committee holds auditor appointment power, and vice versa. Therefore, we first discuss the
importance of audit committee appointment power before presenting our hypotheses.
Audit Committee Appointment Power
In most jurisdictions, legislative guidance (e.g., European Commission 2014) or best practices stipulate the audit
committee should be highly involved in selecting the audit firm. In the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (U.S. House of
Representatives 2002) mandates that the audit committee has the authority to select the audit firm and to oversee the financial
reporting and audit processes to protect shareholder interests. In The Netherlands, where the current study was conducted, the
auditor is formally appointed by a vote of the shareholders at the general meeting of shareholders. However, according to the
5 In The Netherlands, where the current study was conducted, an even shorter eight-year maximum engagement period had been announced to become
effective in 2016 at the time of the study (Section 24 of Wta; The Dutch Audit Firms Supervision Act 2006, amended 01/01/2013). In order to align
with EU regulations, the maximum engagement period in The Netherlands was later extended to ten years (NBA 2016). Interestingly, by 2013 almost
50 percent of the firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange had already started or completed the selection procedure to meet the original eight-year
rotation requirement (Piersma 2014).
6 While our focus is on financial statement users’ assessments, other studies have examined the impact of audit firm rotation on auditors’ responses, i.e.,
independence in fact. The results of these studies are mixed: support for the efficacy of rotation includes Dopuch et al. (2001), Imhoff (2003), Wang
and Tuttle (2009), Hatfield, Jackson, and Vandervelde (2011), and Chung (2004); studies reporting negative, mixed, or no effects include Cameran,
Francis, Marra, and Pettinicchio (2015), Kwon, Lim, and Simnett (2010), Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2009), and Jackson, Moldrich, and Roebuck (2008).
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Dutch Corporate Governance Code (Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee 2008), the audit committee advises
the supervisory board, which in turn nominates the auditor to be selected. Hence, the audit committee plays an important
governance role in the Dutch setting for the auditor appointment decision. Nonetheless, previous research reports that the power
of the audit committee vis-à-vis management in the auditor selection decision varies widely, even in the United States, from
situations in which the audit committee exercises the power of appointment and compensation both formally and informally to
situations where, de facto, management makes these decisions (e.g., Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2002; Cohen et al.
2010; Fiolleau et al. 2013; Dhaliwal et al. 2015; Beck and Mauldin 2014).
The construct of power has been extensively examined in the social psychology and corporate governance literatures (e.g.,
French and Raven 1959; Elias 2008; van Essen, Otten, and Carberry 2015). Most relevant to our focus on auditor appointment
is reward power, a construct from the seminal French and Raven (1959) power taxonomy. Reward power occurs when one
party promises some form of compensation to a target in exchange for compliance (Elias 2008). Given their role as a corporate
governance party, audit committees should reward auditors through reappointment and greater compensation for making
judgments consistent with accounting standards and shareholders’ interests.
If, however, management, rather than the audit committee, has the de facto reward power to appoint the auditor, auditors
are more likely to consciously or unconsciously pursue strategies that reflect compliance with management’s preferences.
Indeed, consistent with research in psychology (e.g., Lerner and Tetlock 1999), prior auditing research has shown the tendency
of auditors to make decisions in line with the party to whom they are accountable when that party’s preference is known (e.g.,
Gibbins and Newton 1994; Salterio 1996; Salterio and Koonce 1997; Cohen and Trompeter 1998; Turner 2001). Importantly,
research has found that if one party is clearly more powerful than the other (e.g., management is more powerful than the audit
committee), then individuals often align their decisions with the more powerful party (Tetlock 1999).
There is widespread recognition and concern in the investment community about management’s influence over corporate
governance parties that may inhibit these parties from properly exercising their responsibilities to protect shareholders’ interests
(e.g., Westphal 1999). Research also shows that investors recognize and act on potential impairments in corporate governance.
For instance, Cohen, Milici Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2016) demonstrate in an experimental study that investors’
assessments of the effectiveness of the audit committee and resulting investment decisions are influenced by the presence of
social and professional ties between the audit committee and the CEO that may impair the independence of the audit committee
from management.
We are aware of a handful of studies examining the effect of appointment power on audit quality (Moore, Tanlu, and
Bazerman 2010; Koch, Weber, and Wüstemann 2012; Dhaliwal et al. 2015), but they all focus on auditor judgments and
outcomes rather than financial statement user assessments. This makes our study the first to our knowledge to examine financial
statement user responses to variations in audit committee appointment power. Importantly, in a forward-looking manner, our
experimental approach allows us to examine the effect of audit committee appointment power on investors’ judgments even
though, as noted previously, such information is not currently required to be disclosed.
Following Power Theory and the reviewed accountability research evidence, we predict a positive effect of audit
committee appointment power on investment recommendations for two reasons; the first related to perceptions about the
current auditor and the second related to the upcoming successor auditor. First, when audit committee appointment power is
high, investors have greater assurances that the current auditor lacks incentives to please management in its reporting
preferences in order to be reappointed, because the auditor is accountable to the audit committee. In contrast, when audit
committee appointment power is low, investors likely perceive that management may influence the current auditor to accept
aggressive accounting practices. Prior literature has provided widespread evidence of management’s propensity to act
strategically and opportunistically in pursuing their self-interests. For instance, research in Agency Theory supports
management’s aggressive financial reporting and actions (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Fama and Jensen 1983).
Second, given high-perceived audit committee appointment power, investors are likely to conclude that, in case of an
anticipated auditor change, the future auditor will be of overall high quality in terms of both competence and independence,
because the audit committee is in the position to choose a high-quality auditor. In contrast, in the case of low-perceived audit
committee appointment power, investors are likely to conclude that management has a strong influence in appointing a future
auditor to their liking, ultimately leading to potential future auditor independence and/or competence concerns. Overall,
following Source Credibility Theory, Power Theory, and Agency Theory, we suggest that resulting perceptions of auditor
independence and competence will be reflected in investment professionals’ investment recommendations, as stated in our first
hypothesis.
H1: Investment professionals’ recommendation to invest will be higher when audit committee appointment power is high
than when audit committee power is low.
In the following section, we discuss why we expect that the audit committee appointment power effect will be moderated
by the auditor selection process in place, and vice versa.
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Interaction of Auditor Selection Process and Audit Committee Appointment Power
We first consider the effect of the audit committee appointment power on investment recommendations for each of the
three auditor selection processes. We posit that audit committee appointment power is least salient to investors’ investment
recommendations in a voluntary auditor selection process, since prior research shows that voluntary audit firm changes are
extremely rare, and investors, especially professional investors— the participants in our study— are likely aware of this. For
instance, Huang and Scholz (2012) report that only 7 percent of their sample of nonrestatement public companies changed
auditing firms. Nonetheless, high appointment power of the audit committee may be of some relevance with a voluntary auditor
selection process as a signal to investors of the committee’s level of independence, which may affect other monitoring activities
such as confronting management on contentious financial reporting and internal control matters.
Greater likelihood of an auditor change leads to investor uncertainties about the quality of the successor auditor. In the case
of both rotation and tendering, an audit committee with high appointment power increases the probability that the future
auditor will be of high quality and hence alleviates such uncertainties. In addition, in the case of tendering, where
reappointment of the current auditor is permissible, high audit committee appointment power diminishes the direct incentive for
the current auditor to please management in order to be reappointed during the tendering process. Hence, the appointment
power of the audit committee is likely to be of greater relevance in making investment recommendations in the case of rotation
and tendering than in a voluntary selection process (see Figure 1).
While we recognize, as discussed previously, that the anticipation of a new auditor due to rotation or tendering may lead
investors to be concerned about a lower level of auditor client-specific knowledge than when there is voluntary selection and
the incumbent auditor is likely to be retained, we posit that an upcoming rotation or tender is likely to trigger an anticipated
enhanced level of independence of the auditor. In the spirit of the proposals in favor of mandatory rotation and tendering, we
expect that independence is viewed by investors as an essential first-order auditor characteristic. That is, what is the value of
client-specific knowledge if the auditor does not use such knowledge to ensure financial reporting is in the interests of
shareholders? Further, client-specific knowledge biases against finding support for our hypothesis below. In all, the findings
will provide an opportunity to test the validity of the contrary view that client-specific knowledge is weighed by investors as
more important than, or of equal importance to, potential gains in auditor independence.
H2a: The difference in investment professionals’ recommendations to invest between high and low audit committee
appointment power is greater in the presence of mandatory rotation or tendering compared to a voluntary auditor
selection process.
Next, we discuss how audit committee appointment power moderates the effect of different auditor selection processes on
investment recommendations (see Figure 1). First, we consider a situation where the appointment power of the audit committee
FIGURE 1
AC POWER by PROCESS on Recommendation Likelihood
Predicted Interaction Effect
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is low with the consequence that investors are faced with perceived threats due to management’s dominant power in appointing
the auditor. As suggested by regulators, mandatory tendering has the potential of alleviating a perceived familiarity threat.
However, when audit committee appointment power is low, investors are likely to assess that the current auditor has
motivations (both conscious and unconscious) to please management for reappointment and higher compensation, i.e., a self-
interest threat (IESBA 2013).
Mandatory rotation likely eliminates the perceived self-interest threat faced by the current auditor, since the auditor cannot
be reappointed. However, absent strong governance mechanisms to safeguard future audit quality, management has the
discretion to appoint an audit firm of their choice, potentially lacking appropriate independence and/or competence. We argue
that the benefits of rotation cannot unfold given the remaining concerns about future auditor quality. As a result, we
hypothesize that regardless of the auditor selection process, investors will view a low level of audit committee appointment
power as reflective of higher information risk and ceteris paribus will recommend a low level of investment.
At the other extreme, in a scenario where the audit committee holds high appointment power, the proposed advantages of
both tendering and rotation can manifest because high audit committee appointment power reduces the aforementioned threats
of self-interest (tendering) as well as future auditor quality uncertainty (tendering and rotation).7 Meanwhile, we expect that
despite high audit committee appointment power, the perceived familiarity threat will persist with the voluntary auditor
selection process and, hence, investment likelihood will be considerably lower in this condition than for rotation and tending,
as reflected in our final hypothesis.
H2b: When audit committee appointment power is low, investment recommendations will be equivalent across auditor
selection process conditions, but when audit committee appointment power is high, rotation and tendering will lead
to a higher investment recommendation than a voluntary selection process.
RESEARCH METHOD
Design, Participants, Task, and Procedure
To test our hypotheses, we conducted an experiment using a between-subjects, three-by-two, full-factorial design, in which
we manipulated the auditor selection process (PROCESS: mandatory rotation, mandatory tendering, or voluntary) and audit
committee appointment power (AC POWER: high or low). The experiment was administered in 2013 in The Netherlands, about
three years before mandatory audit firm rotation was formally implemented. We assigned each participant to one of the six
treatment conditions.8
We sought individuals to participate in the experiment who had sufficient task-specific experience as a professional
investment advisor to evaluate and make an investment recommendation on a common stock investment opportunity. We
obtained the desired number of individuals via two participant pools of professional investors. First, we solicited participation
of experienced investment professionals holding a professional qualification by posting invitations in newsletters distributed to
members of the Dutch Association of Investment Professionals (Vereniging van Beleggingsanalisten [VBA]) and the Dutch
Securities Institute (DSI). A URL in the newsletter directed participants to a web-based version of the experiment. Second,
novice investment professionals enrolled in the final stages of certification courses to acquire professional qualification (CFA
and VBA programs at a large university in The Netherlands)9 also participated in the experiment by completing a paper-based
version of the instrument. All individuals voluntarily participated in the study in exchange for a donation by the researchers of
€2.00 to a cancer charity and the possibility of winning a dinner voucher of €100.10
7 When an audit committee has high appointment power there is the possibility that investors may perceive the current auditor must be of high quality,
and mandatory firm rotation can lead to the potential for a lower-quality successor auditor, especially given the oligopolistic audit market where there
are few audit firm choices. However, this possibility is viewed as unlikely, since investors focus on both independence and competence. As discussed,
the threat of familiarity can lead to conscious or unconscious bias, which rotation is designed to mitigate. Further, there is more than one audit firm in
all industries with the competence to perform a high-quality audit. Such effects, if present, serve to bias against supporting our hypotheses.
8 At the time of data collection, the approval by an institutional review board for the use of human subjects was not required at Dutch universities.
9 The CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst) program prepares individuals for the international CFA I, II, and III exams. The VBA (Vereniging van
Beleggingsanalisten [Dutch Association of Investment Professionals]) program is an investment management program, educating people to become a
‘‘Registered Beleggingsanalyst’’ (RBA).
10 Distribution of the two participant pools to treatment groups was not entirely random due to the later discovery of the need to revise the instrument for
the rotation condition to further clarify the selection process for the replacement auditor. At this stage, we had exhausted our access to the participant
pool of experienced investment professionals with a professional qualification; hence, rotation cells contain only investment professionals enrolled in
certification courses. Table 1 provides demographic data on the treatment groups and the two participant pools. While both participant pools have
sufficient task-specific experience for our experiment, in the ‘‘Results’’ section we report the findings of robustness analyses to rule out the possibility
that our results are driven by the participant pool.
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Participants read the experimental case materials and then responded to the dependent measure (likelihood of
recommending that a client invest) and a secondary measure (recommended investment amount). Participants in the paper-
based setting placed the first part of the materials in an envelope, sealed the envelope, and opened a second envelope, which
contained a post-experimental questionnaire, manipulation checks, covariate measures, and demographic questions. At the end
of the session the experimenter collected both envelopes.
In the web-based version of the experiment, participants read the case materials and responded to measures on eight
consecutive computer screens. Participants were able to browse back and forth to review case facts before responding to the
dependent variable, investment likelihood. However, before proceeding to the post-experimental questionnaire, they were
explicitly asked not to go back to the previous screen while answering consecutive questions.
Experimental Case
Consistent with their customary responsibilities, participants assumed the role of an investment professional who had been
asked to give advice to a client about an opportunity to invest in the shares of a listed company, XYZ Industries. The company
would be part of a European equity portfolio held by an institutional investor where the amount currently available for new
opportunities is €10 million. The total size of the investment portfolio is about €200 million, and the investment opportunity is
described as consistent with the portfolio’s investment policy. Next we provided background information on the investment,
including a description of the organization’s background, strategy, commercial outlook, and some key audited figures. On the
fourth screen/page, immediately preceding measurement of the dependent variable, we described key facts related to the
corporate governance of XYZ and its financial statement auditor. We held audit committee expertise constant across all
conditions, indicating the committee is compliant with regulatory and stock exchange requirements with respect to financial
expertise. The audit committee members were also described as having ‘‘no financial or business ties with the company’’;
hence, economic independence was held constant. The audit firm was described as a Big 4 auditor that had been engaged for
the past eight years and had issued unqualified opinions in all preceding years. Thus, the competence (Big 4) and tenure (eight
years) of the current audit firm were held constant.
Audit Committee Appointment Power
We manipulated audit committee appointment power by varying the extent to which the audit committee and the CFO of
the company, respectively, have influence over the selection and appointment of the auditor. In the high audit committee
appointment power condition, the CFO was described as having ‘‘very limited say in the selection and appointment of the
auditor’’ and that ‘‘the audit committee makes its own decision on which auditor to select.’’ In contrast, participants in the low
appointment power audit committee condition read about a CFO with ‘‘very important say in the selection and appointment of
the auditor’’ and learned that ‘‘the audit committee selects an auditor that is satisfactory to the CFO’s preferences.’’ We use a
relatively strong manipulation of audit committee appointment power in our experiment, with the goal of providing a powerful
test of our hypotheses (Kerlinger 1973).
Audit Firm Selection Process
First, participants in the mandatory rotation condition were informed, ‘‘after an audit firm serves for eight years,
regulations require a change (rotation) to another audit firm, such that a tender process be instituted where various firms,
excluding the current auditor, compete for the appointment as financial auditor. Consequently, 2012 was the current audit firm’s
last audit of XYZ and another audit firm will perform the forthcoming 2013 audit.’’ We selected an eight-year horizon given
that the study was conducted in The Netherlands where this period was proposed and enacted into law prior to the EU
initiatives, and participants might anticipate an upcoming mandatory audit requirement of this time period. We deliberately
referred to the notion of a tender process since we wanted to hold that part of the auditor change constant across rotation and
tendering conditions.
Second, in the mandatory tendering condition, we informed participants ‘‘after an audit firm serves for eight years,
regulations require a tender process be instituted where various audit firms, including the current auditor, compete for the
appointment as financial auditor. Consequently, the current audit firm may or may not be the audit firm that will perform the
forthcoming 2013 audit.’’
Finally, participants in the voluntary selection process treatment learned that ‘‘there are no legal limitations as to how long
the audit firm can serve. Consequently, the auditor may continue for as long as the company and audit firm decide to work
together.’’
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Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is the likelihood that participants would recommend an investment in XYZ Industries on a scale
from 0 percent (‘‘Would definitely not recommend an investment’’) to 100 percent (‘‘Would definitely recommend an
investment’’), i.e., we refer to this variable as the ‘‘recommendation likelihood’’ for brevity. We deliberately did not elicit
participants’ personal investment likelihood since we wanted him or her to perform a task that is consistent with his or her




A total of 136 investment professionals participated in the experiment. Eighteen individuals were eliminated because they
did not respond to all the essential items in the questionnaire. Hence, we omit these observations and are left with a sample of
118 participants.11 Table 1 summarizes the overall demographics of our sample, including demographics across treatment
conditions (Panel A) and the two participant pools (Panel B). The majority of participants are currently employed as investment
professionals (69.5 percent) and they have an average of 10.74 years of experience in this field, confirming that participants are
highly experienced and have the requisite task experience for the study.
The investment opportunity described in the case was intended to raise some level of willingness to recommend the
investment. At the same time, we did not intend to cause a ceiling effect where all participants would select a 100 percent
recommendation likelihood. Participants considered the market (recycling and renewable energy) reasonably attractive (mean¼
4.71 on a scale from 1¼ not at all attractive to 7¼ highly attractive) and the risk return profile of a potential equity investment
in XYZ Industries as moderate (mean¼ 3.95 on a scale from 1¼ very negative to 7¼ very positive), which is in line with our
intentions. Further, the auditor was considered reasonably independent (mean¼ 4.64 on a scale from 1¼ not at all independent
to 7 ¼ highly independent) and relatively competent (mean ¼ 4.87 on a scale from 1 ¼ not at all competent to 7 ¼ highly
competent).12
As described previously, we solicited responses from two distinct channels: 58 (49.2 percent) experienced professional
investors via a web-based instrument, and 60 (50.8 percent) novice professional investors via a paper-based instrument. To
assess the two groups’ homogeneity, we compared them on a number of demographic dimensions and case-based measures,
using two-tailed tests (see Table 1, Panel B for descriptives and respective statistical tests). As expected, compared to novice
professionals, experienced professionals have more working experience as investment professionals (mean ¼ 17.41 years
versus 4.19 years), have analyzed financial statements more frequently (mean¼ 2.36 versus 1.80), and have more frequently
been employed as investment professionals (94.8 percent versus 66.7 percent) than the novice investment professionals.
Despite these differences, both the experienced and novice professionals have on average substantial domain and task-
specific knowledge and are, thus, appropriate participants for the current experiment. Thus, as expected, the two groups do not
differ significantly with respect to their risk appetite nor their case-based judgments regarding recommendation likelihood (our
dependent variable), investment amount, perceived auditor competence, perceived auditor independence, perceived importance
of the auditor’s report, perceived attractiveness of the described market, or the assessed risk-return profile of the investment
target (all p’s . 0.14). Further, we also conducted our hypothesis tests controlling for participant pool and all demographic
variables. The results are equivalent to our primary findings, confirming that our results are not driven by participant pool.
Hence, we do not control for participant pool in our primary analyses.
During hypothesis testing we control for the recommended investment amount (AMOUNT) and the assessed risk-return
profile of the investment target (RISK-RETURN), because both assessments are theoretically expected to affect the likelihood of
investing and are strongly correlated with the dependent variable (AMOUNT: r(116) ¼ 0.56, p , 0.001, two-tailed; RISK-
RETURN: r(116) ¼ 0.54, p , 0.001, two-tailed). The investment amount is an indication of the strength or intensity of the
11 Of the 18 omitted participants, nine did not complete the manipulation checks, the demographic questions, and the case-based measures (auditor
competence, etc.); and another nine did not answer the demographic questions and the case-based measures. When including eliminated participants,
the overall results are robust, with one exception, which we discuss in footnote 14. Further, as shown in Table 1, Panel A, 31 participants indicate they
have no work experience as an investment professional and/or report no prior experience with financial statement analysis, which may present concerns
about whether they have the requisite task experience. Despite the drastic sample and cell size reduction when omitting all of these participants
(remaining sample of n¼ 87), the results are qualitatively equivalent to our primary results, although with lower levels of significance likely due to
lower power of the tests.
12 Some case-based measures are positively correlated with recommendation likelihood, as would be expected (not tabulated): auditor competence (r(116)
¼ 0.24; p , 0.01), audit report importance (r(116) ¼ 0.18; p , 0.10), auditor independence (r(116) ¼ 0.38; p , 0.001), and market attractiveness
(r(116)¼ 0.30; p , 0.01). Controlling for these measures leads to overall results that are robust, with one exception, which we discuss in footnote 14.
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participant’s recommendation to invest, i.e., larger amounts reflect a stronger recommendation, while the risk-return profile
reflects the perceived attractiveness of the investment. Since none of the demographic variables (gender, working experience,
financial statement analysis experience, current employment as investment professional, and risk appetite) are significantly
correlated with recommendation likelihood, we do not include them in the main analysis.
Manipulation Checks
To assess whether our manipulation of audit committee appointment power (AC POWER) was successful, we asked
participants to indicate the primary party that determines the selection and appointment of the auditor. Participants responded
on a seven-point scale with 1¼The CFO; 4¼CFO/audit committee equally; 7¼ the audit committee. The mean in the high AC
POWER condition (5.96) is significantly higher (and in the expected direction) than in the low AC POWER condition (3.18;
t(116)¼ 9.41, p , 0.001, one-tailed). We also asked participants to indicate the extent to which the members of XYZ’s audit
committee are independent vis-à-vis the company’s management, where independence was described as the extent to which the
committee makes its own decisions—whether their choices conflict with management’s preferences (1¼ not at all independent;
7 ¼ highly independent). Again, the difference between the two treatment means is significant and in the expected direction
(t(116)¼3.86, p , 0.001, one-tailed), such that participants in the high AC POWER condition rated independence significantly
higher (mean ¼ 4.74) than participants in the low AC POWER condition (mean ¼ 3.67). Overall, we conclude that our
manipulation of audit committee appointment power was successful.
We assess the effectiveness of the auditor selection process (PROCESS) manipulation in two ways. First, participants
responded to a categorical measure, which asked them to choose among three alternatives to identify the legal requirements as
to the appointment of the audit firm. The vast majority of participants (86 out of 118 participants) provided the correct answer,
and the distribution of correct answers across experimental conditions is significantly different in the expected direction (v2(4,
118)¼ 84.11; p , 0.001). However, 12 participants in the voluntary condition, 8 participants in the rotation condition, and 12
participants in the tendering condition selected a selection process that was inconsistent with the manipulation.
Second, participants responded to a continuous measure from 0 percent (will definitely not be the auditor next year) to 100
percent (will definitely be the auditor next year). As expected, the rotation mean (25.38) is significantly lower than the
tendering mean (58.97; t(76)¼ 4.56, p , 0.001, one-tailed) and the voluntary process mean (68.0; t(77)¼ 6.04, p , 0.001,
one-tailed), and the latter two means are marginally different from each other (t(77) ¼ 1.39; p , 0.10, one-tailed).13
Hypothesis Testing
H1 predicts a positive effect of AC POWER on recommendation likelihood. The ANCOVA in Table 2, Panel B reveals a
significant main effect of AC POWER (F(1, 110)¼12.20, p¼ 0.001, two-tailed) and a nonsignificant main effect for PROCESS
(F(1, 110)¼ 0.45, p¼0.64, two-tailed). Inspection of the adjusted means (see Table 2, Panel A and Figure 2) demonstrates that
recommendation likelihood is higher when AC POWER is high (mean¼ 56.18) compared to low (mean¼ 45.62), providing
support for H1. However, when considering the findings regarding H1 it is important to recognize that in H2a and H2b we
predict interactive effects between AC POWER and PROCESS; thus, this finding cannot be interpreted unambiguously.
To test H2a and H2b, we use a planned contrast test (adjusted for covariates AMOUNT and RISK-RETURN) since we
predict a nonsymmetrical, ordinal interaction (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990). As illustrated in Table 2, Panel C, we use
contrast weightsþ1.5,þ1.5, 0,1,1,1 since H2 predicts the lowest recommendation likelihood when AC POWER is low—
regardless of PROCESS (Cells D, E, and F)—a small increase in recommendation likelihood given voluntary auditor selection
in combination with high AC POWER (Cell C), and the highest recommendation likelihood for rotation and tendering when
AC POWER is high (Cells A and B) (see, also, Figure 1). The contrast shown in Table 2, Panel D is statistically significant (F(1,
110) ¼ 16.13; p , 0.001, one-tailed), providing overall support for our interaction prediction.
Next, we examine planned pairwise mean comparisons (one-tailed and adjusted for covariates AMOUNT and RISK-RETURN)
in Table 2, Panel E. First, H2a predicts that the difference in recommendation likelihood between high and low AC POWER is
greater when there is mandatory rotation or tendering compared to a voluntary auditor selection process. Results in Table 2, Panel E
demonstrate that the positive effect of AC POWER is significant only in the presence of rotation (High 58.29 versus Low 47.09; D¼
11.20, p , 0.05, one-tailed) and tendering (High 60.38 versus Low 41.23; D ¼ 19.15, p , 0.001, one-tailed), but not when a
voluntary auditor selection process is in place (High 49.85 versus Low 48.55; D¼ 1.30, p¼ 0.401, one-tailed).14 The results are
13 Excluding participants that failed the categorical manipulation check of the auditor selection process (leaving a remaining sample of n¼86) does not affect
our primary results. Results are also robust to excluding participants in the rotation condition, indicating a positive reappointment likelihood (leaving a
remaining sample of n¼ 103). Finally, including the assessed reappointment likelihood as a covariate does not alter the primary findings, either.
14 In addition, (non-tabulated) difference-in-differences tests confirm that the difference in recommendation likelihood between high and low AC POWER
is smaller for the voluntary process compared to rotation (t(77) ¼ 1.92; p , 0.05, one-tailed) and tendering (t(77) ¼ 3.43; p , 0.001, one-tailed).
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TABLE 2
Hypothesis Testing




Rotation 58.29 47.09 52.69
(3.76) (3.66) (2.63)
n ¼ 19 n ¼ 20 n ¼ 39
Tendering 60.38 41.23 50.81
(3.86) (3.57) (2.63)
n ¼ 18 n ¼ 21 n ¼ 39
Voluntary 49.85 48.55 49.20
(3.66) (3.66) (2.59)
n ¼ 20 n ¼ 20 n ¼ 40
Total 56.18 45.62 50.90
(2.17) (2.10) (1.51)
n ¼ 57 n ¼ 61 n ¼ 118
Panel B: ANCOVA Results
Source SS df MS F-value p-value
Model 32612.49 7 4658.93 17.40 , 0.001
AC POWER 3266.48 1 3266.48 12.20 0.001
PROCESS 239.60 2 119.80 0.45 0.640
AC POWER  PROCESS 1575.11 2 787.55 2.94 0.057
AMOUNT 9553.75 1 9553.75 35.69 , 0.001
RISK-RETURN 7793.95 1 7793.95 29.12 , 0.001
Error 29445.99 110 267.69



















þ1.5 þ1.5 0 1 1 1




Contrast weights (þ1.5, þ1.5, 0, 1, 1, 1) 110 16.13 , 0.001




Test of H2a (Effect of AC POWER across PROCESS Conditions)
Voluntary High AC POWER versus Low AC POWER 1.30 5.18 0.401 (one-tailed)
Rotation High AC POWER versus Low AC POWER 11.20 5.26 0.018 (one-tailed)
Tendering High AC POWER versus Low AC POWER 19.15 5.26 , 0.001 (one-tailed)
Test of H2b (Effect of PROCESS across AC POWER Conditions)
High AC POWER Rotation versus Voluntary 8.44 5.25 0.055 (one-tailed)
Tendering versus Voluntary 10.53 5.32 0.025 (one-tailed)
Rotation versus Tendering 2.09 5.38 0.699 (two-tailed)
(continued on next page)
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consistent with our predictions of a greater AC POWER effect for rotation and tendering than for the voluntary process. However,
we also expected a residual, albeit smaller, effect of AC POWER for the voluntary process, which we did not observe. We will
discuss this unexpected result further in the Conclusions and Discussion. Hence, our results partially support H2a.
H2b predicts that rotation and tendering will lead to a higher investment recommendation vis-à-vis a voluntary selection
process when AC POWER is high but not when AC POWER is low. As shown in Table 2, Panels A and E, when AC POWER is
high, the respective differences between the rotation and voluntary conditions (58.29 versus 49.85; D¼ 8.44, p¼ 0.055, one-
tailed) and between the tendering and voluntary conditions (60.38 versus 49.85; D ¼ 10.53, p ¼ 0.025, one-tailed) are both
positive and (marginally) significant. In contrast, when AC POWER is low the respective differences between rotation and
voluntary conditions (47.09 versus 48.55; D ¼1.46, p ¼ 0.78, two-tailed) and between tendering and voluntary conditions
(41.23 versus 48.55; D ¼7.32, p ¼ 0.155, two-tailed) are not significant. Hence, the findings support H2b.15
Supplemental Analysis
One of our manipulation checks revealed that the perceived likelihood of current auditor reappointment differs only
marginally when comparing tendering and the voluntary process. This finding is consistent with Fiolleau et al. (2013), who
found that management, the audit committee, and the competing auditors all perceive that the incumbent auditor would most
likely be selected again in a tendering process. Interestingly, however, in non-tabulated analyses we observe that this result is
dependent on the appointment power of the audit committee. First, in the low AC POWER condition the perceived
reappointment likelihood difference between tendering (65.24) and voluntary selection process (66.00) is nonsignificant (D¼
0.76; t(39)¼0.09, p¼0.466, one-tailed). However, in the high AC POWER condition, the difference (70.00 versus 51.67; D¼
18.33) is significant (t(36)¼ 1.89; p¼ 0.034, one-tailed), underlining the suggestion that a high power audit committee may
contribute to enforcing the effectiveness of mandatory tendering by greater willingness to appoint a new auditor when viewed
as necessary.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Mandatory audit firm rotation and tendering have been considered or enacted by the PCAOB and the EU, respectively, as
a means to strengthen audit quality and thereby enhance investor confidence and resulting investment decisions. However,
there is little empirical research to examine whether these proposed auditor selection processes accomplish these objectives.
Another important mechanism to enhance audit quality is the audit committee, since one of its main responsibilities in many
countries is to select the auditor. Drawing on Source Credibility Theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) and Power Theory
(French and Raven 1959), we predict that the effect of the auditor selection processes on investment recommendations depends
on the level of audit committee appointment power, and vice versa.
We test our predictions in an experiment with a rich subject pool of investment professionals. Participants respond
positively to an audit committee with high appointment power when mandatory rotation or tendering is present, but not when
auditor selection is voluntary. This finding confirms that audit committee appointment power is highly salient to investors only
when periodic auditor reconsideration is mandated. When auditor selection is voluntary, investment professionals assume that





Low AC POWER Rotation versus Voluntary 1.46 5.19 0.780 (two-tailed)
Tendering versus Voluntary 7.32 5.12 0.155 (two-tailed)
Rotation versus Tendering 5.86 5.15 0.258 (two-tailed)
The dependent variable is the likelihood that participants would recommend an investment in XYZ Industries on a scale from 0 percent to 100 percent.
Audit committee appointment power (AC POWER) is manipulated between subjects as high or low. Auditor selection process (PROCESS) is manipulated
between subjects as rotation, tendering, and voluntary. In all panel tests, we control and adjust for participants’ recommended investment amount
(AMOUNT) and their assessed risk-return profile of the investment target (RISK-RETURN).
15 We also conducted two additional robustness checks: (1) including the 18 eliminated participants (n¼ 136) (see footnote 11), and (2) controlling for
case-based measures as covariates (see footnote 12). In both checks the overall results are robust and equivalent to our primary results, except that H2b
does not hold for the difference between rotation and voluntary selection given high AC POWER: (1) D¼ 6.39; p¼ 0.115, one-tailed; (2) D¼ 6.26; p¼
0.119, one-tailed). All other mean comparisons are consistent with the primary results.
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Second, when the audit committee has low appointment power, all three auditor selection processes lead to an equally low
investment recommendation likelihood, suggesting that neither tendering nor rotation will be viewed by investors as effective
in a weak corporate governance setting. That is, the auditor selection process and audit committee appointment power are
considered complements, not substitutes, in enhancing audit quality. Accordingly, we also find that in the tendering selection
process investors assess the likelihood of auditor reappointment to be lower than the voluntary selection process, but only when
the audit committee has high appointment power. Albeit with respect to independence in appearance, in all, our results confirm
the recent claim by Fiolleau et al. (2013, 865): ‘‘If management, with private information and interests, continues to have
substantial influence over hiring the auditor, the regulatory reforms for audit firm rotation and/or audit committee
empowerment are likely to be ineffective.’’
As noted, audit committee appointment power is not currently publicly disclosed information. However, a recent SEC
(2015) concept release, inviting comments on a proposal to enhance audit committee disclosures of its role in the appointment
of the auditor, suggests that this may change in the near future. An important feature of our experimental method is the ability
to test the effect of disclosing this governance information. Our findings highlight that information about audit committee
appointment power has a significant effect on the impact of alternative auditor selection processes on investment
recommendations, but also that the effect of auditor selection processes is contingent on audit committee appointment power.
Thus, it is important for regulators to establish policies to ensure investors have confidence that sound corporate governance
mechanisms are in place to optimize the effects of auditor selection processes. The results further suggest that the disclosures
proposed by the SEC (2015) concept release have decision relevance and are important.
As with any study, there are limitations that should be considered in interpreting the findings. As noted, we manipulate
audit committee appointment power, while such information is not currently publicly disclosed. This manipulation may, thus,
be viewed as a limitation to external validity. However, an important feature of our experimental study is a proactive
examination of the impact of such information on investors’ judgments, an especially relevant issue given the recent proposal
by the SEC (2015) for increased disclosures on the auditor appointment process. Also, we note the possibility that professional
investors, such as the participants in the current study, may obtain some information on the appointment power of the audit
committee through knowledge of the composition and individual members of the supervisory board, investor calls, and one-on-
one meetings with board members.
Further, the potential costs of a change in auditor were not made explicit to participants in the experiment, such as
potentially lower auditor effectiveness with a new auditor who does not know the client well or the additional transition costs
by the client and the auditor (e.g., learning). However, professional investors such as those involved in this study are likely
aware of these costs. Finally, some of the primary findings deviate from our predictions (e.g., H2a: we did not find a difference
FIGURE 2
AC POWER by PROCESS on Recommendation Likelihood
Observed Interaction Plot (Adjusted Means)
Plotted means are adjusted for participants’ recommended investment amount (AMOUNT) and their assessed risk-return profile of the investment target
(RISK-RETURN).
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between high and low AC POWER for the voluntary process) and two of the robustness checks do not replicate the primary
results (i.e., H2b: we did not find a difference in investment recommendation between rotation and the voluntary process when
AC POWER is high; see footnote 15).
The major finding in this study is that investors do not view mandatory audit firm rotation, mandatory tendering, or
voluntary auditor selection in isolation of a company’s internal corporate governance mechanisms. These findings have
important practice and policy-making implications, suggesting that in order to give market participants greater comfort about
audit quality, both auditor selection processes and corporate governance must be jointly considered. Since the focus of the
current study is on investor perceptions and assessments, future research is needed to examine how the auditor selection process
and corporate governance together impact preparer reporting behavior, as well as auditor independence in fact.
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